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PROCESS AS PURPOSE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, COSTLY SCREENS,
AND EXAMINATION AT THE PATENT OFFICE
Jonathan S. Masur†
Abstract. The United States Patent and Trademark Office has, by this point,
acquired a well-deserved reputation for ineptitude and inefficiency. Patent
examiners do a remarkably poor job of screening out invalid applications, and
yet the patent examination process remains surprisingly expensive. Proposals
for reforming the patent office—of which there are many—have thus focused
on improving the quality of patent review while decreasing the attendant costs.
In so doing, scholars have entirely overlooked the valuable function performed
by the high costs associated with obtaining a patent. These process costs force
applicants to disclose private information regarding the value of their
intellectual property and serve as a costly screen against a particularly insidious
class of low-value patents: those that are useful only as a means of extracting
nuisance settlements from commercial firms. The patent system‘s continuing
viability therefore rests in significant part upon the barrier imposed by
administrative cost. And though the patent office is the most prominent
forum in which this type of passive screening operates, it is far from the only
one. Administrative procedures function as costly screens in areas as diverse
as landlord-tenant and employment law, environmental permitting, and
immigration law. In each case, the private costs of the navigating the process
may pose a more effective barrier to entry than the process itself.
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C.

INTRODUCTION
Articles about the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the
―PTO‖) typically begin with a recitation of examples of the terrible patent
grants for which the PTO has become notorious. Patents on well-known, preexisting inventions, patents on ideas or concepts that should not qualify as
inventions, patents that are employed only to extract ransom payments from
genuinely innovative commercial firms—this is the parade of horribles usually
presented as evidence of the PTO‘s ineptitude. By this point it should come as
little surprise that such patents—and so many of them—have managed to slip
through the cracks. Examiners spend on average only eighteen hours
reviewing each patent, and their incentives are structured so as to bias them
heavily in favor of granting patent applications.1 At the same time, what the
PTO lacks in efficacy it has managed to make up for in expense: an inventor
will spend between $10,000 and $30,000 prosecuting a patent through
issuance.2
Accordingly, arguments regarding the patent office have traditionally
centered around whether patent examinations are worth the (considerable)
cost—whether the patent office should spend more money pursuing more
rigorous examinations, or whether it should forego these efforts entirely and
scrutinize patents only after they‘ve been granted and asserted against alleged
infringers.3 In one respect, however, these discussions have been entirely
consistent: in all cases, they have weighed the costs of engaging in patent
review against the benefits of that review measured by the number of ―bad‖
patents caught and rejected. By this view, the administrative costs of
prosecuting a patent are simply the purchase price of the active scrutiny
conducted by the PTO.
But this is not the only function performed by the patent system‘s
process costs. Scholars on both sides of the debate have overlooked the fact
that the high costs of prosecuting a patent force inventors to determine ex
1

See infra notes 18–29.

2

See id.

3

See Part I.C., infra.
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ante whether the property rights they might acquire are genuinely worth the
expense. This ex ante private cost creates what is, from the perspective of the
patent applicant, a type of costly screen—a private examination of the patent
to determine whether its expected benefits, discounted to present value,
exceed the cost required to obtain it. This costly barrier to obtaining patents
forces potential applicants to disclose private information about the value of
their inventions, information that the patent office is otherwise unable to
obtain.
This paper applies, for the first time, a costly screening model to the
procedural operations of the Patent and Trademark Office.4 According to this
model, prospective patent applicants first decide at time t1 whether to file
applications with the PTO. To savvy applicants, the PTO‘s behavior when
confronting the application at time t2 is a known quantity. The PTO can
eventually be made to grant essentially any patent application,5 though at a
significant cost to the applicant (measured in the tens of thousands of dollars).6
Those costs will, to some extent, scale inversely with respect to the social value
of the patent. Moreover, the patents of least (often negative) social value are
also those of least private value (though the relationship is hardly linear). The
up-front costs of obtaining a patent thus will select against those patents that
are most likely to be welfare-diminishing, or so this paper will argue.
The process costs of obtaining a patent will not dissuade an applicant
possessing a genuinely valuable invention; the administrative cost of obtaining
a patent is a rounding error when compared with an invention that may be
worth millions or hundreds of millions of dollars. This barrier to entry will
discourage only prospective patentees who place a value on their intellectual
property in the range of only tens of thousands of dollars.
I draw here upon standard costly screening models that have been profitably deployed in a
variety of legal and economic contexts, though never with respect to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial
Review, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753 (2006); Hans Gersbach, The Money-Burning Refinement: With an
Application to a Political Signaling Game, 33 Int‘l J. Game Theory 67 (2004); Eric A. Posner,
Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1137, 1160–61 (2001); Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Sorting out the Differences Between
Screening and Signaling Models, in PAPERS IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY
SEMINAR AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY (Michael Dempster, ed.) (1989); Paul Milgrom & John
Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 796 (1986); Michael A.
Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUART. J. ECON. 561 (1973).
4

5

See infra notes 17–30.

6
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In all probability, there is very little to be lost and much to be gained
from deterring applicants who might pursue this category of patents. Patents
that are worth only a few tens of thousands of dollars are not likely to form
the basis for a sustainable business; nor are they likely to subsume significant
pieces of valuable, commercialized inventions, and thus hold substantial worth
through litigation and licensing. Much more likely, patents at the very low end
of the spectrum will one of two types. Either they will be discarded,
unenforced patents that serve only to increase the search costs imposed on
firms attempting to ascertain the boundaries of pre-existing property rights—
the brambles that make up the ―patent thicket,‖ in popular parlance.7 Or they
will be valuable only for the nuisance settlements they can be used to extract.8
Patent-holding firms might acquire such patents with the intention of filing
multiple small lawsuits against productive companies, hoping to settle those
lawsuits for nuisance value and repeatedly extract small rents. These are the
types of lawsuits—and thus the types of patents—most likely to inhibit
innovation and market entry while contributing least to productivity and
innovation.
What makes the PTO‘s costly screen so important is the inefficacy of
the active examination that the costs themselves are used to purchase.
Traditional patent examination, standing alone, can no longer be counted on
to perform an adequate check against invalid patents that will necessarily serve
as little more than a source of social costs. By rendering these patents
prohibitively expensive to obtain, the patent office‘s administrative processes
inadvertently protect inventors and firms from some of the worst abuses that
the flawed examination process might otherwise allow. Even with such a
screen, the patent system is hardly a model of accuracy or efficiency. But the
system‘s continued functionality, and the fact that incentives to innovate have
not be overwhelmed by the threat of nuisance lawsuits, are due at least in part
to the barrier imposed by meaningful patent application costs.
Proposals for reforming the patent office are hardly new to the
literature, having become by this point something of a cottage industry.9
Nonetheless, no analysis of PTO procedures has yet recognized the screening
See generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and StandardSetting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 119 (2001).
7

8

See Part II.C., infra.

9
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function that patent process costs perform or the social value of imposing
these ex ante deadweight losses. 10 This costly screening approach thus holds
significant implications for the many proposals for reforming or reconfiguring
the Patent and Trademark Office and calls into question the assumptions that
have underlain prior cost-benefit analyses of patent procedures.
More generally, the application of costly screening models to
administrative procedure may reveal a wide variety of contexts in which
ostensibly ineffective administrative processes actually serve as powerful costly
screens. In legal settings ranging from environmental permitting, to
immigration law, to landlord-tenant regulation, the private costs of navigating
an administrative process may serve to eliminate many of the unworthy
candidates that administrators themselves are unable to expose. Absent an
understanding of the function and importance of costly screens, it is possible
that scholars and courts have systematically understated the value of
administrative process.
Part I of this paper summarizes the operation of the Patent and
Trademark Office, the pathologies surrounding patent examination, and the
harmful social consequences produced by nuisance patents. Part II describes
and analyzes how patent office procedures effectively impose a costly
screening against low-value patents, despite the inadequacy of examination
procedures themselves. Part III abstracts away from the particular context of
the patent office and describes the operation of costly screens more generally
and their function within three other important areas of administrative law.
I.

THE PATENT OFFICE: HISTORIC PROBLEMS AND
CONVENTIONAL REMEDIES

For decades, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has come
in for trenchant criticism about the manner in which it reviews patent
applications, the costs it imposes upon applicants, and the general impotence
of its review. Due in large part to the incentives it places upon its own
employees, patent office review has acquired a reputation as an extremely poor

Indeed, , the few prior articles that apply costly signaling or screening models to patents
address themselves only to the possibility that patents may be used by firms as an inexpensive
means of signaling financial markets or other outsiders. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents
in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 144 (2000); Clarissa Long,
Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). None of the existing literature considers the
possibility that signals or screens may operate within the patent office.
10
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screening mechanism against non-novel or otherwise invalid patents.11
Examiners have little personal reason to resist the granting of invalid patents
and significant private incentives to allow those patents to go forward.
Examiners also spend very little time scrutinizing each patent. Consequently,
patent attorneys have come to believe that they can effectively ―wear down‖
even recalcitrant patent examiners with continuous appeals and re-filings.
These improperly granted patents can enact a social cost, dissuading firms
from entering into markets or commercializing inventions and clogging the
processes of innovation.
Suggested reforms to this system fall into two camps. Some scholars
advocate investing greater amounts of money in more robust patent office
review and realigning examiners‘ incentives to neither favor nor disfavor
patent grants. Others, pointing to the high costs associated with patent
examinations and the large percentage of patents that hold little or no
commercial value, suggest scaling back (or even eliminating) the PTO
examination process and moving towards a system of patent registration and
strong ex post review in the courts or a redesigned administrative agency.
Both groups, however, treat the expenses that the PTO and private parties
must bear in prosecuting a patent solely as the cost of the active examination
that takes place, to be avoided or minimized wherever possible. And it is
impossible to know whether the PTO‘s examination procedures are even
remotely cost-benefit justified on those grounds.
A.

Rational Examiners and Misguided Incentives

Stories of ridiculous, invalid, and obvious patents are by this point
legion.12 In recent years the PTO has allowed patents on a peanut butter and
jelly sandwich, a stick, and a method for swinging on a swing, to name just a
few examples. Far more importantly, however, the PTO has almost surely
granted invalid patents on thousands, if not tens of thousands, of software,
biotechnology, or integrated circuitry inventions.13 These patents, on
inventions that would have been obvious to scientists in the field or were
anticipated by prior work, carry with them the potential to stifle innovation, to
discourage firms from entering into useful markets, and generally to impede
11

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2007).

See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).
12

13

See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 37 (2004).
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the optimal functioning of the American economy. Even if they are never
litigated—indeed, especially if they are never litigated, and never see the inside
of a court of law—these ―bad‖ patents impose significant deadweight losses
and delays in precisely those industries in which rapid progression and the
growth of small-scale market participants are most important.
These patents exist first and foremost, of course, because of the rents
that they permit their owners to charge. But they are allowed to exist also
because of the inadequacies and pathologies of the procedures employed by
the patent office to screen them out. The notion that one can, by this point,
―patent anything‖14 is not idle hyperbole meant to describe a system of lax
enforcement. It is, in fact, more than anything else an accurate description of
the goals of the patent office (as exemplified in its internal procedures) and its
outcomes. The patent office describes itself as existing to provide a service to
patent applicants, who are its ―customers,‖15 and states quite plainly that its
mission is ―to help our customers get patents‖ and ―to ensure strong
intellectual property for all Americans‖16—hardly a celebration of the office‘s
role as examiner. In any other federal agency this might be mere rhetoric, a
paean to the idea of a friendly, facilitative government bureaucracy. At the
patent office it is an outlook on institutional role exemplified in the procedures
that the office has created to process applications and the incentives placed
upon the key actors within the system, the patent examiners.
Each patent application filed with the PTO is referred to a single
patent examiner who holds plenary authority over the application for nearly all
of its life.17 After she has examined the patent, the examiner must choose
whether to grant the patent application or reject the patent application. As an
initial matter, rejecting a patent application is more difficult and timeconsuming for the examiner than granting one. If the examiner grants the
application, little further procedure is necessary—the examiner simply
announces that she is allowing the application to mature into a patent. If the
See, e.g., Paul E. Schaafsma, A Gathering Storm in the Financial Industry, 9 STAN. J. L. BUS. &
FIN. 176, 184 (2004); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
14

See, e.g., WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW
(1994 Annual Review), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1994/pg1-5.pdf.
15

Id.; A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW (1997 Annual Review), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1997/.
16

For a useful summary of the patenting process, see ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN
FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 48–54 (2007).
17
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examiner rejects the patent, however, she must provide a statement of the
reasons for her rejection, identify the relevant prior art and the section of the
Patent Act that has caused her to reject the application, and generally explain
the rationale behind her actions.18
Perhaps not surprisingly, patent examiners receive salary bonuses
based on the number of patent applications that they are able to process.19
This fact, by itself, might skew the examiner‘s incentives, inclining him towards
acceptance rather than rejection based upon the differing workloads and time
expenditures required.20 But the problem is in fact far worse and lies with how
the PTO understands what it means to fully process an application.
Unlike a patent grant, an examiner‘s decision to reject a patent
application does not end the matter. First and foremost, the patent examiner
cannot issue a ―final‖ rejection on the first go-around.21 If the examiner
initially rejects the patent, the applicant is entitled to request a re-examination
in front of the same examiner.22 These preliminary rejections are known as
―office actions,‖23 and they consist in principal of a correspondence from the
examiner to the applicant comprising the information described above—which
claims cannot be granted, which prior art renders the invention unpatentable,
and so forth. At this point, the patent applicant may choose to abandon the
application, though in practice few do. Instead, most applicants elect to
respond to the patent examiner‘s concerns, revise the application (often editing
or redacting certain claims), and request that the examiner re-examine the
application.24 The patent examiner is then again faced with the choice of
whether to accept the application or reject it.
37 CFR § 1.104(a)(2) (2007) (―The reasons for any adverse action or any objection or
requirement will be stated in an Office action . . . .‖).
18

19

JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at 116.

Cf. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (2007) (noting that judges‘
preferences for leisure time will incline them to grant more motions for summary judgment
than would otherwise be appropriate).
20

21

37 C.F.R. § 1.111(a)(1) (2007).

22

35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2007).

23

37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(2) (2007).

―Request‖ is a bit of a misnomer; the examiner has no choice but to consider the application
a second time.
24
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After this second examination, the examiner may choose to issue a
―final‖ rejection of the application, though she need not do so.25 In theory,
the examiner and the applicant could engage in an infinitely iterated series of
preliminary rejections and re-examinations; and indeed many patents are the
subject of three or four office actions before they are finally accepted or
rejected.26 Yet even if the examiner issues a final rejection of an application,
the matter is far from over. If the applicant does not wish to abandon the
invention, she may select between two possible courses of action. First, the
applicant may appeal the decision to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (―BPAI‖), which can overturn the examiner‘s decision and send
the patent back to the examiner for further consideration.27 If the applicant
loses before the BPAI, she then holds the right to appeal the decision to the
Federal Circuit.28 Alternatively, the applicant may elect to file a continuation
application, which is little more than a request for re-examination (presumably
involving edited claims or new arguments) attached to an additional filing fee.29
The patent application remains before the same examiner as if the ―final
rejection‖ had not been genuinely effective.
Meanwhile, as these various appeals are taking place, the application
resides in the examiner‘s file as an open matter, rather than a processed one,
and the examiner does not accrue credit towards her next bonus.30 Worse, if
her decision is overturned she faces the prospect of expending even more time
on an application that has not provided her with any meaningful return. The
rational, self-interested examiner thus has a tremendous incentive to simply
grant the vast majority of patent applications—a self-interest that is only

37 CFR § 1.113(a) (2007) (―On the second or any subsequent examination or consideration
by the examiner the rejection or other action may be made final . . . .) (emphasis added).
25

This estimate is based upon conversations with patent prosecutors at a number of law firms,
principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file with author.
26

27

35 U.S.C. § 134 (2007).

35 U.S.C. § 141 (2007). The applicant may also bring a civil action in federal district court
against the director of the patent office, seeking essentially the same relief, but few choose this
route. Id. § 145.
28

29

35 U.S.C. § 120 (2007).

30

JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 13, at 136.
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buttressed by the organizational tenets of the patent office itself.31 Scholars
thus estimate that patent examiners spend, on average, only eighteen hours
scrutinizing each application.32
Consequently, while it may not be the case that every patent will be
granted every time (especially on the first attempt), a determined patent
applicant can eventually overwhelm the patent office through repeated efforts.
This appears to be exactly what takes place. In any given year, approximately
25% of patent applications are actually continuation patents—refilings of
applications that had already once been denied.33 Reported rates of patent
rejections are thus greatly overstated; those patents almost inevitably return as
continuations. In fact, between 1963 and 2005 (the last year for which the
USPTO currently provides data), the patent office received 4,016,707 new
utility patent applications and issued 3,891,905 patents,34 an astounding success
rate for applicants of 96.8%.35 To a great extent, then, the decision regarding
whether to grant a patent lies in the hands of the applicant.36 If the patent is
This is in contrast to other administrative organizations, such as prosecutors‘ offices, that
structure internal cultures and incentives so as to mitigate the effect of rational self-interest.
Prosecutors themselves have an incentive to dismiss cases or settle them quickly, for short
sentences, in order to dispose of their workload and maximize leisure time. Prosecutors‘
offices counter this incentive by creating cultures that value longer sentences and higher
conviction rates and evaluating line prosecutors on those grounds. See generally Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 17 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
31

Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001); John
R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 310 (2001).
32

33

Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 13, at n. 162.

See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2006, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.htm.
34

See also Lemley, supra note 32, at 1528 (arriving at the same 97% figure). This 96.8% rate
may even understate the overall rate of patent grants. Patent grants or rejections will typically
lag applications by 18 to 36 months, the amount of time consumed by the examination.
Patents filed in 2005 will not likely be granted or denied until 2006 or 2007, while patents
granted in 1963 were likely filed in 1962 or 1961. The rate of patent filings and grants has
increased significantly over the past four decades; inventors filed 66,715 utility applications in
1963 and 207,867 applications in 2005. Consequently, by over-counting grants in 1963 and
under-counting them in 2005, the overall statistic likely underestimates the percentage of
patent applications that eventually result in issued patents.
35

In a world of perfect incentives and perfect information, the patent grant rate would be
100%. Inventors would never file for patents that they knew would not be granted, and
examiners would never make errors when evaluating the patents before them. This world is,
36
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worth pursuing, the inventor possesses the leverage necessary almost to
guarantee that it will issue.
B.

The Costs of “Bad” Patents

Patents are injurious to competition. This is, of course, precisely the
reason that patents exist—they provide inventors with limited monopoly
benefits in order to encourage innovation.37 This tradeoff is accepted with
respect to valid patents on novel inventions, but even invalid, improperly
granted patents on pre-existing technologies have the power to dissuade
potential competitors from entering a market and stunt investment in further
research.38 This is the case regardless of whether or not the invalid patents are
ever asserted; the threat posed by the existence of those patents is enough to
raise barriers to market entry.39
Any prospective market participant must determine ex ante the costs
and risks involved in operating.40 Even invalid patents augment these costs in
three ways. First, a market entrant must investigate the intellectual property
that exists in the field and make some preliminary inquiry as to those patents‘
validity.41 This investigation, even if cursory, can be quite expensive.42
of course, entirely hypothetical, and a combination of poor information, optimism bias on the
part of inventors, and even random errors (on both sides) should combine to drive the rate of
grants well below 100%. The fact that that figure sits at 97% is thus powerful evidence of bias
within the system.
See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6 (1998); MERGES & DUFFY,
supra note 17, at 253–256 (describing the incentive systems meant to drive the patent law).
37

See Ian Ayres & Paul Klempere, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985,
1018–20 (1999).
38

Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, Minn. L. Rev.
(2007).
39

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech L.J. 263, 270 (2000) (―[P]atents have in terrorem effects: no one wants
to invest in a business that cannot succeed without first winning a lawsuit.‖).
40

See generally Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1344–47 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
41

42

See Part II.C.2., infra.
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Second, invalid patents can hamper a firm‘s ability to raise capital43 or write
contracts with potential customers.44 Financial markets will be wary of firms
that may not be sustainable because they traffic in infringing products.
Customers will hesitate before forming business relationships that may expose
them to suits for contributory infringement45 and resist relying upon suppliers
who may be shut down or driven out of the market by a suit for infringement.
Finally, risk-averse, uncertainty-averse firms will have reason to fear the cost of
defending a lawsuit for patent infringement, not to mention the threat of
having to pay licensing fees or royalty damages. Patent lawsuits of any length
impose asymmetric costs upon the participants. It is easier and less costly for
patent holders to prove infringement than it is for alleged infringers to prove
invalidity,46 largely because patents arrive in court accompanied by a
presumption of validity.47 Litigation, even relatively non-meritorious litigation,
thus presents a substantial threat.
A single, significant patent of plausible validity can certainly cause
these types of problems for a nascent competitor. Importantly, though, a large
quantity of frivolous, obviously invalid patents within the field can create the
same sorts of barriers to entry.48 As an initial matter, search and information
costs for the entering firm will be higher regardless of whether these patents
are ever enforced, as the market entrant is forced to comb through a dense
―patent thicket‖ in order to ascertain the boundaries of existing property

See Fed. Trade Comm‘n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and
Patent Law and Policy, ch. 2, at 8 (2003) (―The threat of being sued for infringement by an
incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless claim—may ‗scare . . . away‘ venture capital
financing.‖) (quoting testimony of Professor Joshua Lerner, opening statement available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/lernerjosh.pdf).
43

44

Leslie, supra note 39, at 125–27.

See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit—Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 634, 641
(1950) (―Contributory infringement . . . can serve as an effective side-attack to cut off the
economic support of a small producer.‖).
45

46

See Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 13, at 152.

35 U.S.C. § 282 (2007). However, the chorus in favor of altering this legal rule is growing.
See Douglas Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, ―Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity,‖
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963996.
47

See Leslie, supra note 39, at 132–37; Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent
Rights: A New Approach to Innovation, at 6–17 (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020276.
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rights.49 It may be also difficult for new firms to credibly signal necessary third
parties such as banks, investors, and customers—particularly when those third
parties do not possess a level of sophistication in the relevant technologies—
that a set of threatening patents are invalid.
Most significantly, nascent market participants might face higher upfront costs if litigation uncertainties and information asymmetries force the
firm to pay small licensing or settlement bribes to a series of patent-holders
who choose to file nuisance lawsuits.50 Firms that face the prospect of being
nickel-and-dimed by the owners of multitudinous dubious patents may well
choose to refrain from investing in the development of new technologies in
the first instance.51 In addition, the nuisance lawsuits themselves can produce
significant deadweight losses; litigants expend thousands of dollars in
transaction costs to prosecute and settle nuisance lawsuits worth $20,000 or
less.52 Through sheer force of numbers, substantial quantities of plainly invalid
patents can impose significant social costs.
C.

Classic Reforms

In response to the inadequacies of the patent office and the costs of
bad patents, scholars have advanced a number of proposals designed to shore
up that failing agency and provide a more effective screen against non-novel
and potentially harmful patents. These suggested reforms have assumed a
variety of shapes: increases in PTO funding that would allow the office to hire
more examiners (thus permitting each examiner to spend a greater amount of
See id.; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 17, at 615–616 (describing the economics of search
costs).
49

50

See Leslie, supra note 39, at 133; Part II.C., infra.

See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation,
44 B.C. L. Rev. 509, 515 (2003); Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.
1943) (Hand, J.) (describing a patent as a ―scarecrow‖ that can deter competition by its very
existence); But see Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (Posner, J.) (―[A]
patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage competitors from making the
patented product or using the patented process, and so will not confer monopoly power . . .
.‖). Judge Posner may be correct that a patent must be of at least ―colorable‖ validity in order
for it to be used as a means of exerting monopoly power, but see Leslie, supra note 39, at 133,
but his analysis does not speak to the possibility that the asymmetric transactions costs
involved in patent litigation will enable the holder of a plainly invalid patent to extract small
payouts from market entrants.
51

52

See Part II.C., infra (describing the economics of nuisance-value patent lawsuits).
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time on each patent), improved training for patent examiners and more careful
matching of examiners‘ subject-matter expertise and the applications they are
meant to review, and alterations to the internal incentives of the patent office
that would credit examiners as much for rejecting an application as for
granting one.53
These innovations undoubtedly hold the potential to improve the
patent office‘s performance and contribute a substantial public good by
ridding the marketplace of invalid patents. What is more doubtful, however, is
whether the benefits that improved performance at the patent office might
confer are worth the costs that such improvements would entail. The patent
office grants approximately 1.5 million patents per year, the vast majority of
which are commercially irrelevant and will never be the subject of a lawsuit, a
license, a royalty payment, or even an attempt to extract value; nor will they
ever interfere with a company‘s efforts to innovate. In an important 2001
article, Mark Lemley observed that the patent office has no way of knowing ex
ante which patents will be valuable or significant in the long run and which will
not, and thus is essentially forced to scrutinize all of them if it wishes to
scrutinize any of them.54 The value of these patent applications is classic
private information held principally by the patent applicants—and possibly
shared by their competitors—and is extremely costly for the patent office to
access As a result, any increases in patent examination rigor will compel the
PTO to spend billions of additional dollars examining patents that will play no
substantial role in the economy in order to ensure that it has inspected the
comparatively few that will.55
Lemley performed a back-of-the-envelope calculation and concluded
that increased patent office scrutiny of would not be cost-benefit justified; he
prefers that the patent office maintain the status quo.56 Others have taken
See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Douglas Lichtman, & Bhaven Sampat, What to do About Bad Patents?,
28 REGULATION 12–13 (2005); John R. Allison, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One
Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 729 (2006); JAFFE &
LERNER, supra note 13, at 203; H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
53

Lemley, supra note 32 (addressing the liabilities forced upon the patent office by its mandate
to treat all patents identically).
54

The PTO currently spends approximately $1 billion per annum examining patents. Jaffe &
Lerner, supra note 13, at 172. Patent applicants spend several times that amount prosecuting
patents. Id.; see also Part II.A., supra.
55

Lemley, supra note 32, at 1508–11 (arguing that further investment in patent scrutiny,
because it must be spread across hundreds of thousands of patents per year, would result in
little gain in the quality of issued patents).
56
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issue with Lemley‘s rough calculations and argued that further scrutiny would
be worth the investment.57 And another, smaller cadre has asserted that patent
examinations should be eliminated altogether, with the patent system reverting
to a simple system of registration, akin to the copyright regime.58 Many of
these proposals are coupled with suggestions for meaningful inter partes postgrant administrative review, mechanisms by which potential infringers can
challenge a patent‘s validity without undertaking expensive litigation in federal
courts.59 Some even recommend a multi-tiered system of patent review in
which applicants can opt for one of several levels of PTO scrutiny with
correspondingly strong ex post presumptions of validity.60
But for all the ink that has been spilled on this topic, the answer to the
question of whether greater investment in patent examinations would be
worthwhile—or even whether current investments are justifiable on these
terms—remains entirely unknown, and potentially unknowable. It is worth
noting that the problem extends beyond the fact that the absolute dollar
benefit for each dollar invested in the PTO is unclear. The proportional
marginal benefit of each additional dollar—when compared with the dollar
that came before or after it—is also difficult to decipher. Regardless of their
eventual conclusions regarding the patent office, scholars have all assumed that
investments in patent examinations follow typical laws of diminishing marginal
returns: each dollar spent, or each additional minute invested in reviewing a
patent application, is less valuable and will generate a less substantial return
than the dollar or minute that preceded it. In more concrete terms, the
See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in
the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004); Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 13 (proposing that
the patent office expend greater funds on more rigorous examination).
57

See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the
Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for
Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55
(2003).
58

See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 943 (2004); Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 13; Lemley, supra note 32.
59

See, e.g., Lemley et al., What to do About Bad Patents?, supra note 53, at 12–13; Kristen Osenga,
Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing Congestion in the Patent Office, 33
FLA. ST. L. REV. 119 (2005). Even more exotic proposals abound, including suggestions for
tradable patent rights that will limit the number of patents in force at any given time by
compelling patentees to bid on a finite pool of litigation rights. Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra
note 48, at 22–39.
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assumption is that if the patent office had sufficient funds such that examiners
spent 36 hours reviewing each patent, rather than 18 hours, the examiners
would successfully screen more invalid patents, but fewer than twice as many
invalid patents.
While these sorts of relationships hold in many economic contexts,61
there is no reason to believe that they exist here. Consider the process of
reading a patent. The average patent is on the order of twenty pages long, and
contains a written description of the invention, often a series of figures or
diagrams used to illustrate the invention, and finally a series of claims that
define the boundaries of the property right.62 If an examiner is to grasp what
exactly a patent application entails, she must read both the specifications—to
understand the invention—and the claims—to grasp what the inventor seeks
to protect. This entire process might take one hour—forty-five minutes for
the specifications, and fifteen minutes for the claims—but the first forty-five
minutes of effort are worthless without the last fifteen. The marginal rate of
return on time invested increases at the forty-five minute mark.
Now consider a search for prior art. On some occasions, an invention
will be unpatentable because it was anticipated by a single piece of prior art,
and in those instances the patent examiner‘s search for prior art may become
less valuable as time goes on and the marginal increase in the odds of finding
that single patent decreases. But much of the time an invention is not
patentable because its novelty has been subsumed by several pieces of prior art
in combination, and only when the examiner finds these multiple prior art
references will she understand that the invention is not novel. Again, the first
search—and the reading of the first several examples of prior art—may be
worthless without the ones that follow it. Assume for a moment that it takes
an examiner approximately an hour to locate, read, and analyze each piece of
prior art against the patent application. The examiner may get nothing more
out of two hours of work than she does out of one hour, but might reap more
than double the benefits from four hours of work than she does from two.
For some fields, such as software and business methods, the majority
of prior art might be located in non-patent sources—old products, past
See, e.g., Charles Silver, Class Actions--Representative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
194, 214 (2000); Richard Craswell, Passing on the Cost of Legal Rules: Efficiency
and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991); Alan Schwartz, A
Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1057–59 (1977).
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37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71–1.75, 1.81 (2007).
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practices, academic textbooks, and the like—and thus examiners might be
forced to invest substantially larger amounts of time before their efforts at
searching for prior art become worthwhile. This analysis may differ from
patent to patent, and from technological field to technological field; the
principal point is that it is impossible to ascertain ex ante how much time an
examiner will require to scrutinize a patent adequately, or at what point the
examiner‘s extra efforts cease to be worthwhile. It is thus essentially
impossible to gauge the appropriate amount of money to invest in patent
examinations, so long as those examinations are viewed strictly as tradeoffs
between cost and intensity of scrutiny. Up until now, that is precisely how
they have been viewed, and it is the primary goal of this article to unseat that
assumption.
II.

PATENT PROCEDURES AS COSTLY SCREENS

The inefficacy of examination procedures raises the question of why
they have continued to exist in their current condition in the face of so many
calls for reform and such uncertainty as to their value. Entrenched private
interests have blocked some types of reforms, and efforts to wholly remake
the patent office would undoubtedly meet with stiff resistance. It is also
possible that the current PTO procedures represent parties‘ best intuition as to
what level of patent scrutiny will produce more benefits than costs, though no
actor has any reliable data on the subject. But even on these accounts, the
persistence of a regime of administrative procedure so rife with doubts as to its
value is more than a little puzzling.
The answer to this puzzle lies, counter-intuitively, in the high costs
associated with a patent examination—particularly the costs imposed upon
patent applicants. Scholars have treated these costs as deadweight losses
within the patent system—expenses to be avoided or minimized wherever
possible.63 But these substantial costs—even purely transactional expenses
such as drafting a patent application and paying one‘s patent attorneys—force
applicants to gauge the value of their own patents and forego applications for
inventions that will not likely generate significant returns. In particular, the
high cost of obtaining a patent screens against patents that are useful only for
their nuisance value and as a means of harassing commercial firms to obtain
small settlements, and in favor of patents on inventions that are likely to hold
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 32, at 1496 (―Conducting a more thorough examination of patent
applications requires society to spend more time and more money. Whether these resources
would be spent wisely depends on the return we would get for that money.‖).
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genuine commercial value. The costs of complying with PTO procedures thus
effectively compel patent applicants engage in a type of ex ante sorting, based
on private information. At the Patent and Trademark Office, procedural costs
are not an impediment to accurate decision-making; within some domains,
they are the best functioning mechanism for compelling that type of decisionmaking in the first place.
A.

Costs

The costs to a patent applicant from prosecuting a patent derive from
a variety of sources: PTO fees, legal fees, and internal firm costs (principally in
the form of the inventor‘s time and energy). The distribution of costs among
these various sources is important, and so what follows is a brief
decomposition of the costs involved in prosecuting a typical patent, United
States Patent No. 6,062,350 (―the ‗350 patent‖). U.S. Patent 6,062,350 is a
patent on a ―braking system for an amusement device‖ (essentially a roller
coaster), and was the subject of an infringement action filed by its owners,
Saiko et al., in April 2004.64 That suit was dismissed on summary judgment by
a district court in California,65 and the judgment was affirmed by the Federal
Circuit in April 2007. 66
1.

PTO Fees

The Patent Act67 provides a schedule of fees for various stages of the
patent application process, some of which apply to all patents and others of
which are graduated based on the length or complexity of the patent.68 The

64

Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, Intamin, Ltd., 2005 WL 3517968, at 6.

Suit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, but that
court issued no published opinions.
65

Intamin Ltd. v. Magnetar Technologies, Corp., 483 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The patent
is of approximately median length and complexity, and was chosen due to the fact that it was
the subject of the most recent infringement decision by the Federal Circuit when this analysis
commenced.
66

67

35 U.S.C. § 41 (2007).

The application that eventually matured into the ‗350 patent was filed on October 10, 1997,
at which point the fees charged by the patent office were not quite as high as they are in 2007.
In the interest of clarity, I will endeavor to estimate all costs in 2007 dollars, including using
the 2007 schedule of patent filing fees.
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initial application requires a series of fees totaling $1,000,69 and the applicant
must pay an additional $1,400 when the patent issues.70 Applicants are allowed
three ―free‖ independent claims (additional independent claims incur fees of
$78 apiece) and twenty total ―free‖ claims (additional claims are $18 each);71
the ‗350 patent includes only one independent claim and seventeen total
claims, and thus these fees do not apply. The PTO also charges applicants
$360 for any application that contains a multiple dependent claim, which the
‗350 application does.72 There are a variety of other minor fees and expenses
which either do not apply or would likely be extremely small73 In sum, then,
the owners of the ‗350 patent likely would have paid the patent office
approximately $2,760 in fees to have the patent granted.
In addition, the PTO charges regular—though small—maintenance
fees with the intention of forcing patent holders to regularly evaluate whether
their patents remain valuable and are worth preserving as property rights. A
patent will expire and cease to be enforceable if its owner fails to pay the
necessary fees in a timely manner.74 These fees are assessed three and a half
years, seven and a half years, and eleven and a half years after the patent has
been granted.75 The patent office issued the ‗350 patent on May 16, 2000, and
so by the summer of 2007 the patent holders had paid the $830 fee that comes

69

37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(1), (k), (o) (2007).

70

35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(2) (2007); 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a).

71

35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1)(B); 35 C.F.R. § 1.16(h), (i).

72

37 C.F.R. § 1.16(j).

For instance, there is a $0.25 fee for each photocopy made by the patent office, id. §
41(d)(1), and a $3 fee for each copy of a patent furnished to an applicant. Id. § 41(d)(2).
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Id. § 41(b). The rules are not actually as onerous as this description might imply. Patent
owners have a six month ―grace period‖ within which they can make late payments, id.;
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and
the patent commissioner can expand that grace period an additional 24 months if the failure to
pay was ―unintentional,‖ 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1); Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 n. 1 (Fed. Cir.
1995), and indefinitely if the lapse was ―unavoidable.‖ 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1); Lehman, 55 F.3d
at 608.
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35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2007).
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due at the three and a half year mark76 and would soon have to pay the $1900
fee that accrues after seven and a half years.77
Thus, by the April 2007 (and the completion of the action for
infringement), Saito et al., the owners of the ‗350 patent, had likely paid
approximately $3,590 in fees to the patent office in total.
2.

Attorneys’ Fees and Prosecution Expenses

Patent office fees on the order of $3,600 per patent are not
insignificant, particularly to a small corporation or solo inventor.78 But they
are dwarfed by the amount that applicants will have to pay the patent attorneys
and patent agents who draft the patent application and shepherd it through the
PTO‘s process. Data on these points are a bit fuzzy, and no current national
survey of patent application prices exists. In addition, of course, many law
firms bill clients by the hour, and patent applications can vary greatly in
complexity and thus in the time needed to complete them. Nonetheless,
estimates from a variety of sources have coalesced around a reasonably narrow
range of figures.
An initial patent application on a relatively complex technology—a
semiconductor or biotechnology patent, for instance—when prepared by a
reputable law firm, will typically cost between $6,000 and $10,000.79 But this is
just the entry expenditure, the amount necessary to get the applicant through
the patent office door with an application that has a realistic chance of being
granted. Few technically sophisticated patents are granted on the first try;80 far
more frequently, the patent examiner will issue a preliminary denial of the
76

Id. § 41(b)(1).

Id. § 41(b)(2). After eleven and a half years, the patent holder must pay a fee of $2,910. Id. §
41(b)(3).
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The Patent Act reduces the maintenance fees that small businesses, independent inventors,
and non-profit organizations must pay by 50%, id. § 41(h)(1), but all other filing and
application fees remain the same.
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This estimate is based upon conversations with attorneys at a number of law firms,
principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file with author.
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I do not mean to indicate that an initial grant is either easy or expeditious. On average,
more than eighteen months elapse between the filing of a patent application and the first
response (positive or negative) from the PTO. See Lemley, supra note 32, at 1521 n. 93. If
anything, this amount of time has only lengthened since Lemley compiled his figures in 2002.
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patent, demanding that the applicant clarify some portion of the patent,
respond to one or more pieces of prior art, or otherwise remedy some defect
with the application.81
These office actions, which are generated with very little investment by
the patent office (remember that the average patent receives only eighteen
hours of attention from an examiner), can nonetheless be quite expensive for
the applicant. The applicant‘s attorney are forced to expend additional hours
reading prior art, consulting experts, redrafting or rethinking the patent, and
generally replying to the patent examiner‘s complaints.82 Consequently, higherprofile law firms can charge anywhere between $1000 and $3000 per office
action, and a typical patent is subject to between one and four office actions
during its lifetime.83 In addition, each request for re-examination pursuant to
an office action carries with it an additional fee, which ranges from $120 (if the
applicant responds within the first month)84 to $2,160 (if the applicant requires
more than four months to respond).85
If the patent applicant is forced to file a continuation patent, the
process restarts and the overall costs could be $5,000 or $10,000 greater.86
And if the applicant chooses to prosecute an appeal to the BPAI or the
Federal Circuit, or becomes embroiled in an interference with a competing
inventor, she faces the potential of costs that are greater by as much as an
order of magnitude.87 Even a typical patentee, who is not forced to go to such
lengths, will spend on the order of $6000 to placate the patent office‘s
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See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(2) (2007).
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See id. § 1.111(a)(1) (2007).

These estimates are again based upon conversations with attorneys at a number of law firms,
principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file with author.
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37 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1) (2007).
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Id. § 1.17(a)(5).
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Lemley, supra, at 1499.

By one estimate, the average cost of an interference that is litigated to conclusion is in excess
of $100,000. Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS‘N Q.J. 193 (1990).
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concerns and push through a successful application.88 All told, then, an
average patentee, such as the owner of the ‗350 patent, might spend
approximately $18,000 to prosecute successfully a patent application;89 a mere
$4,000 of which would derive from fees paid to the PTO, while the remaining
$14,000 accrues in the form of attorneys‘ fees.
3.

Internal Firm Costs

Firms will also incur patent prosecution costs as inventing employees
are forced to devote time and energy to aiding in the preparation of the patent
application. These costs are derivative of the legal fees associated with patent
applications—they stem from the need for technical expertise in preparing
applications and responding to office actions. Nevertheless, internal firm costs
are difficult to estimate and will vary widely by firm and technologies, and so I
will treat them conservatively as zero here.
B.

Process Costs Reconsidered
1.

The Conventional View

It is tempting to treat these private expenses—particularly the
attorneys‘ fees required to prosecute an application—as little more than the
cost of doing business before the PTO. Indeed, this is the conventional
understanding of the various procedures that comprise the patent examination
system: the participation of the applicant is the lowest-cost method of
providing for effective examination of patents. One could conceive of a
patent system in which an applicant simply handed over lab notebooks and
prototypes to patent examiners, who then studied the inventor‘s work to
determine if she had created some valuable intellectual property. This
approach would undoubtedly minimize transactions costs to the applicant, but
only by transferring those costs (and more) to the patent office. Overall costs
would also rise—the applicant is better positioned than the examiner to
scrutinize her own invention and determine whether there exists a protectable
property right. The applicant is more familiar with the invention and the
This number is based on the midpoints of the previous two ranges: 2.5 office actions at
$2000 per office action, and a response time of just under two months, for which the fee is
$450. Id. § 1.17(a)(2).
88

$8,000 (the average initial drafting cost) + $6,000 + $3,590 = $17,590, and there are likely to
be other miscellaneous fees and expenses involved. In 2001, Lemley estimated the average
cost at $10,000 to $30,000. Lemley, supra note 32, at 1498. If anything, then, the estimate here
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relevant technology and can conduct such an inquiry more quickly and
cheaply—thus, it is the inventor who prepares the application.
So too for the process of rejection and re-examination. The patent
examiner could, in theory, simply conduct a thorough search of the prior art
record and arrive at a final decision as to a patent‘s validity without the need
for iterative consultations with the applicant. But it is more efficient for the
examiner to test the strength of her objections against the best rebuttals that
the applicant can offer, rather than simply seeking to satisfy himself of the
accuracy of her determinations without the benefit of outside counsel. 90 (In
addition, it is presumably fairer to provide the applicant with an opportunity to
have her views heard.91)
On this theory, the costs imposed on both the applicant and the patent
office are merely the necessary concomitant of patent office review. Patent
process costs purchase accuracy in examination; the patent office expends
resources (and demands that private parties do the same) in order to determine
if patents are valid and worth granting, and to prevent ―bad‖ patents from
being issued.92 The objective for the patent system is to minimize these
transactions costs wherever possible. The examination process, then, is
worthwhile only to the extent that the examination results themselves are costbenefit justified—that patent examiners are able to provide a benefit to the
economy by eliminating non-novel patents that exceeds the costs incurred
through their examinations.
The problem, as noted above, is that it is impossible to know on this
account whether the examination processes are cost-benefit justified. The
optimal level of investment in patent examination may be zero, or it may
exceed the current level, or the patent office may have miraculously selected
the ideal level of examination. But given the incentives that examiners face to
grant patents, and the near-consensus that applicants have it within their
power to overwhelm examiners and force through patents if they are
sufficiently persistent, there is reason to suspect that the patenting process is
Cf. Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal Courts: An
Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 92
CAL. L. REV. 425 (2004) (describing the virtues of the adversarial system).
90

See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982 (2003) (exploring the value of participatory rights in civil litigation).
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not cost-benefit justified in its current form. Appropriately, then, every
proposed restructuring of the patent office has focused on the tradeoffs
between costs and accuracy and looked for methods of minimizing the former
while improving the latter.93
2.

Process as Purpose

If this conventional view completely encapsulated the costs and
benefits of patent examination, the entire patent system might long ago have
collapsed in upon itself as aggressive patentees forced an unending stream of
bad patents upon reluctant and overwhelmed examiners. But the conventional
view entirely overlooks the most valuable function of the patent examination
process: irrespective of whether patent examiners are effective at weeding out
invalid patents, the substantial costs of prosecuting a patent force applicants
themselves to select which patents are genuinely worth pursuing.
Before an inventor ever files an application, she must assess whether
the invention will likely be worth the cost of its prosecution.94 This requires
the patentee to gauge a number of factors, principally 1) whether the patent is
at least colorably valid, and how difficult it will be for the patentee to enforce it
against third parties; and 2) whether the invention is commercially viable or
covers a component of a device with commercial potential. If the patent is
either useless as a property right (because it is self-evidently invalid or
unenforceable), or if it concerns inventions and technologies for which there is
no viable market, it will not likely be worth the expense of prosecution.
In essence, the cost of prosecuting a patent forces the applicant to
conduct both the same screening that the PTO itself attempts to undertake
(the validity inquiry), as well as an additional examination that the patent office
quite deliberately does not attempt. Again, the patentee can obtain
information regarding the patent‘s validity at least as cheaply as the patent
93

See supra notes 49–57.

There will be slippage around this calculation. Individual decision-makers will suffer from
optimism bias regarding the likely value of their (or their firms) patents. See generally Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,
74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 632, nn. 106–09 (1999). Particular individuals within firms may also have
incentives to have patents granted even when those patents are valueless for the firm. For
instance, some technology firms award bonuses to employees each time a patent is issued
listing that employee as an inventor. Other individuals may simply seek patents because of the
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examiner, if not significantly more cheaply. The transaction costs of obtaining
a patent thus transfer quite effectively to the patentee the responsibility of
ensuring that the patent will appear at least facially valid, and that attempts to
assert it (even outside of court) are likely to succeed with some probability.95
In addition, the commercial viability of an invention serves as an
indication of whether the patent is sufficiently important that the patent office
(and private parties) should expend resources determining its validity. This is
not a question that the PTO attempts to answer directly; the Patent Act allows
the PTO to inquire only into a patent‘s validity, not into the invention‘s
commercial use or its effect on the economy.96 The PTO does not even
engage in different types of scrutiny for inventions in different fields or of
differing commercial values.97 Patents on semi-conductor devices98 and
patents on peanut butter and jelly sandwiches99 officially undergo the same
vigor of examination. Nor would the PTO be well-positioned to determine
the value of examining a patent, even were it so inclined. On this question—
even more than with respect to validity—there is a distinct informational
asymmetry between the patent applicant and the PTO. The applicant likely
does business in the field and understands the relevant markets, while the
patent examiner may have relevant technical expertise but likely lacks a
working knowledge of the state of the trade.100 The fact that applicants
This is not to say that the system functions perfectly, of course. Of the approximately
160,000 utility patents granted each year, see PTO, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 19632004, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (Aug. 2005), the vast
majority are economically worthless. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 Berkeley
Tech. L. J. 1521 (2005). This is undoubtedly due in part to inventors‘ biases and misaligned
incentives, see supra note 94, but it is not necessarily attributable entirely to the bounded
rationality of participating individuals. Many firms may file patents with expected present
values well in excess of the $18,000 process cost, only to see their gambles fail to pay off.
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35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2007).

See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575
(2003) (exploring the ways in which the patent law might be leveraged to perform exactly this
function).
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See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,486,795
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See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596.

A patent applicant might even hold an informational advantage over competitors within the
same marketplace when it comes to determining the commercial value of an invention. That
patent application might be valuable only when mixed with some number of trade secrets or
commercial plans that the patentee has not yet revealed.
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possess incentives to apply only for commercially significant inventions does
not provide any information as to whether patent terms are efficient,101 but it
avoids the expenditures of unnecessary process costs by the patent office on
those patents that are most likely to become economically irrelevant.
This applicant-centered screening mechanism is driven predominantly
by the private process costs of obtaining a patent, rather than the fees paid to
the patent and trademark office. By the back-of-the-envelope calculation
undertaken here, fees account for only $4,000 of the approximately $18,000
required to obtain a typical patent; the lion‘s share is devoted to the fees paid
to attorneys and technical experts to draft and prosecute the patent—classical
transactions costs. In this sense it is very much the process of obtaining a
patent—the construction of a colorable application, negotiations with the
patent examiner, and so forth—that provides the incentive for applicants to
conduct ex ante examinations of the value of their own inventions.
Viewed simply as a flat fee, the transaction cost of obtaining a patent
represents a significant outlay for a solo inventor or very small firm,
particularly given that modern inventors frequently file more than one patent
at a time (even on closely related inventions). More importantly, though, these
costs will scale based the technical complexity of the patent, the crowdedness
of the technological field in which it resides (the more crowded the field, the
more prior art for the patent examiner to draw upon), and the extent to which
the patent borders on invalidity. Patents of suspect validity are more likely to
garner repeated office actions from the PTO, as examiners seek to interrogate
the novelty of the claims. So too for patents on inventions in technical areas
already heavily congested with prior art, particularly prior art in the form of
issued patents102—the greater the quantify of extant prior art, the more likely
that she will find art that calls one or more of the claims into question.
Responses to office actions are expensive for applicants—on average,
more than $2,000 apiece103—and represent a significant percentage of the total
cost of pursuing a patent. If the patentee is forced to turn to the BPAI or the
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CAL. L. REV. 241, 266 (1998) (explaining and analyzing this significant point).
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Examiners have better access to patents than they do to prior art in any other form. They
may not even know of the existence of other types of prior art, such as recent scholarly or
trade publications. See Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 13, at 145–49 (enumerating the many
limitations of the typical patent examiner).
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103

See Part II.A., supra.
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Federal Circuit, the costs could increase by an order of magnitude.
Consequently, costs will be significantly higher for inventors who attempt to
push through questionable patents, or who attempt to patent inventions in
heavily commercialized fields in which those patents might do the most
harm.104 Prospective applicants will be forced to adapt to these higher
expected costs. In effect, then, the very administrative processes that allow
patentees to ―wear down‖ examiners serve to increase the barriers to entry for
the least desirable patentees. If the patent system is crudely successful at
screening for invalid or damaging patents, it is not necessarily (or primarily)
because examiners are actually denying those patents.105 Rather, the procedural
mechanisms that exist in the name of ―customer service‖ compel applicants
themselves to avoid filing applications on unpatentable inventions in the first
instance.
C.

Low Barriers and Nuisance Values

That the administrative procedures involved in patent prosecution
impose a costly screen against low private-value patents is not normatively
significant without some understanding of what sorts of patents this screen is
likely to exclude. The section that follows will endeavor to describe with some
particularity the classes of patent that such a screen will select against.
It is certainly not the case that all patents with high private value also
hold high social value, and that all patents with low private value also involve
low or negative social value. Nonetheless, the PTO‘s process costs-based
screen succeeds in exploiting an asymmetry within the economics of patent
rights. Patents with high private value can be of high social value—significant
discoveries, major breakthroughs, important inventions—or low to negative
social value—minor or insignificant innovations that are useful only as
blocking patents or a means of extracting rents.106 But patents of low private
104

See Part I.B., supra.

Proposals to create more robust ex post, inter partes screening mechanisms, see, e.g., Jaffe &
Lerner, supra note 13, are consistent with this approach and would likely be beneficial to the
system as a whole. By themselves, though, they would not necessarily succeed in deterring
applications for nuisance-centered patents or the filing of essentially nuisance lawsuits. Inter
partes screening mechanisms will involve the same information and cost asymmetries as does
litigation defense, though the overall costs may be lower. Pressures to settle for nuisance value
will remain.
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See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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value and high social value are effectively nonexistent. The monopoly rights
conferred by patents ensure that any invention with high social value will also
create significant private value for its inventor.107 Consequently, patents with
low private value will necessarily be of low—or, more importantly negative—
social value as well. It is this category of patents that the PTO‘s costly screen
will act to exclude.
1.

Valuable Inventions

Before turning to the sub-categories of patents that will be effectively
excluded by an $18,000 barrier to entry, it is worth briefly canvassing those
classes of patents that will not. The question of whether a patent is privately
valuable to the holder—and by ―valuable‖ here I mean worth well in excess of
the $18,000 required to obtain the patent—and the question of whether the
availability of a patent has spurred socially productive research and innovation
are not always coterminous. Patents may be valuable because they can be
deployed offensively, with the intention of collecting awards for infringement
or licensing fees;108 they may hold value as defensive mechanisms for
protecting commercial products from competition or from suit for
infringement;109 and they might be usefully employed as signals to dissuade
potential market entrants or attract investors and other third parties.110 All
valuable patents will, however, have two common characteristics: they will be
at least plausibly valid,111 and they will claim inventions (or important
components or subparts of inventions) that are commercially viable.
The converse is true as well. Any patent of at least colorable validity
that claims all or part of marketable product will hold meaningful value
(though of course the patent-holder may not always succeed in realizing that
value). Eighteen thousand dollars is a fraction of the seed money necessary to
107

This is true at least to first approximation. See notes 115–19, infra, and accompanying text.

See generally Moore, supra note 95, at 1522–1524. On licensing, see Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (2003).
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See John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios, 69
ANTITRUST 851 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001).
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See, e.g., Long, supra note 10, at 651–53; Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of
Venture Capital, 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 137, 144 (2000).
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See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2007).
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start a small business; any property right that gives even a small-time
commercial venture the right to exclude competitors will be worth far in
excess of that amount. This relationship holds even if the patent covers only a
small portion of a larger product—the braking system for a roller-coaster, for
instance.112 The braking system may be worthless without the coaster, but the
patent will possess significant commercial value as long as the invention it
describes is superior to the publicly available alternative.
This is not to say, of course, that all welfare-enhancing innovation will
lead to patentable inventions or valuable property rights. Research and
development may generate unpatentable ideas or knowledge that do not, by
themselves, constitute inventions. Or it may lead to developments whose
commercial applications are not realized until well after the information has
passed into the public domain. But the $18,000 cost of obtaining a patent will
not discourage researchers who believe that their work will lead to marketable
inventions. The only patents screened out by the costs of prosecution will be
those that have no independent mercantile value—those that are worth
obtaining only for the meager nuisance settlements they can be used to extract.
2.

Opinion Letters and Nuisance Payments

Few patent lawsuits begin with the filing of court papers.113 The most
common practice is for the patent-holder to send the alleged infringer a letter
notifying the infringer of the patent‘s existence and obliquely threatening legal
action.114 The purposes are two-fold: to put the infringer on notice of the
patent and lay the framework for an eventual claim of intentional
infringement,115 and to open negotiations in the hope of a favorable
settlement.
112

See United States Patent No. 6,062,350.
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For that matter, few lawsuits of any type begin in this fashion.

Sophisticated potential plaintiffs issue only oblique threats in order to avoid creating ―a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.‖ MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs seek
to avoid creating the conditions under which defendants could file for declaratory judgment,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2007), in order to preserve the right to choose the forum in which the
suit will be litigated.
114

As a remedy for which the court can award treble damages. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2007); King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 866–67 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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Some of these incipient lawsuits involve two competitors within an
industry, parties that have likely eyed one another warily for some time and
kept close watch on each other‘s patent portfolio. But a substantial percentage
of these actions are initiated by a solo inventor or patent holding company
with no commercial ventures beyond the exploitation of its intellectual
property portfolio. (―Patent troll‖ is the less collegial term.116) At the
inception of such an action, plaintiffs—particularly small, non-commercial
plaintiffs—enjoy a substantial informational advantage over their targets.
Plaintiffs know the content of their own patents, as well as other information
relevant to the patents‘ validity, such as prosecution histories. The defendant‘s
allegedly infringing device is an actual physical product that exists in the world
whose relevant characteristics may be easily ascertainable. By contrast, the
infringer very likely knows nothing of the patent and its claims (much less its
prosecution history), and may have little information regarding the relevant
prior art that preceded the patent.
In order to cure this informational asymmetry, most targets of
infringement letters will immediately commission an opinion letter from
outside counsel as to whether the patent is valid and whether the firm‘s device
infringes it.117 The purpose of this letter, like the purpose of the patentholder‘s notice of infringement, is two-fold. The letter is meant both to
inform the potential infringer of the strength of the patent-holder‘s case and to
guard the potential infringer against later claims of willful infringement118 by
supplying the basis for a good-faith belief that the patent is not infringed.119
As with every other legal component to the patent system, these
opinion letters can be quite expensive. Major law firms typically charge at least
$8,000 to $12,000 to write opinion letters covering technologically
116

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_troll.

This is standard practice within the field, see Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 32, a fact
that I confirmed repeatedly in the course of interviews and conversations with patent attorneys
at several firms.
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The patent statute allows courts to assess treble damage penalties against willful infringers.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2008) (―. . . the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.‖); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (setting
forth the modern standard for determining when infringement has been willful).
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See, e.g., Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Production Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 414 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (opinion letter provides near-impenetrable defense to charges of willful
infringement); Nickson Industries v. Rol Manufacturing Co., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed.Cir.1988)
(same).
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sophisticated patents and inventions, and those costs can reach $30,000 or
more if the technologies involved are sufficiently complex or the patents and
products sufficiently numerous.120 For potential defendants, then, every
colorable assertion of infringement carries with it a nuisance value in the
neighborhood of $10,000—this is the amount that the infringer will have to
spend at the outset in order simply to understand the contours of the putative
case against it.121 Even after surmounting this hurdle, accused infringers must
confront the asymmetries that make patent lawsuits more expensive to defend
than to bring.122 Patent defendants thus have every incentive to make lawsuits
disappear as quickly and as painlessly as possible.
3.

Price Barriers to the Nuisance Market

Were patents relatively inexpensive to obtain, firms could center entire
businesses around obtaining facially plausible patents and filing substantial
numbers of nuisance lawsuits. Alternatively, patent holders who believed that
they owned valuable intellectual property and intended to garner substantial
fees through licensing or litigation would be able to use nuisance lawsuits as a
type of insurance, falling back upon small settlements when companies
appeared resistant to larger demands.123 The informational imbalances that
attend patent litigation would make viable a whole host of minor hold-up
actions brought by small, non-commercial entities against larger firms doing
business in the marketplace. These sorts of lawsuits represent intellectual
property protections at their very worst, deterring firms from entering markets
These estimates are again based upon conversations with attorneys at a number of law
firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file with author.
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This is not to say that potential defendants would always pay $10,000 to make every patent
lawsuit disappear. Targets for nuisance lawsuits have incentives to send credible signals to
potential future accusers that they will not be easy marks by litigating claims aggressively rather
than settling them. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 669, 712–13 (1986); cf. James Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the
Escalation of International Disputes, 88 Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 577 (1994); Thomas C. Schelling, An
Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 281, 283–84 (1956) (―Concession not only may be
construed as capitalism, it may mark a prior commitment as a fraud, and make the adversary
skeptical of any new pretense at commitment.‖). Wal-Mart is one company known for this
strategy. See, e.g., Keeton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 & n. 13 (E.D. Tex.
1998).
121

122

See Part I.B., supra.

See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. Penn. L. Rev. 519 (1997)
(analyzing the nuisance lawsuit as a business tactic).
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or developing new products and consuming litigation resources while
contributing essentially zero productive innovation.124 They are little more
than carriers for welfare-diminishing transaction costs.
The cost of obtaining a patent—approximately twice the short-term
nuisance value of a patent lawsuit—is the most powerful extant barrier to the
exploitation of patent information asymmetries and the proliferation of
nuisance lawsuits with negative social value. When patents cost more to
obtain than they can be used to extract in one or two nuisance settlements,
they become substantially less attractive as a business tool and less open to
exploitation. This is not to say that nuisance lawsuits will never be profitable,
or that firms will never pursue questionable patents with the intent only to
extract such settlements. A firm may be able to garner more than one quick
payout with each patent, though at the same time it will not necessarily be
capable of coercing targets—especially repeat players—into paying even
inexpensive blackmail. Because of the costs of obtaining a patent, a firm
cannot count on being able to turn a profit, or even recoup its investment, by
threatening some number of small, meritless suits; it must actually believe that
it has an invention worth commercializing or a valid patent in a commercially
useful field before a patent application becomes worth the cost of prosecution.
Table 1: Social and Private Values of Various Patent Classes

High
private
value

High social value
Commercial products;
improvements;
major components

Low
private
value

None

Low or negative
social value
Blocking patents;
valid but not novel
patents
Nuisance patents;
minor inventions

Table 1 summarizes the relationships between private and social value
for various patent categories. As the top row indicates, patents that carry high
private value—and will be therefore worth obtaining despite the costly screen
imposed by PTO procedures—can come in a variety of forms, only some of
124

See Part I.B., supra.

The Price of Process

33

which are socially valuable. An expensive screen set in the tens of thousands
of dollars will not select out socially deleterious patents on insignificant
breakthroughs that nonetheless carry significant private worth. At the same
time, however, a costly screen also will not bar patents of high social value and
low private value; such patents do not exist. Any invention involving a serious
technological breakthrough or the creation of a commercially viable product or
process will necessarily grant its holder a valuable monopoly right.125 Only
patents of low private value and low or negative social value—precisely those
patents most likely to diminish social welfare—will be meaningfully affected by
the cost of PTO procedures. Absent this costly screen, low-value nuisance
patents would proliferate, imposing social costs both through their sheer
numbers126 and through the nuisance suits to which they give rise.127
It may well be possible to obtain a patent on nearly anything, and it
may be within the power of applicants to wear down patent examiners and
force through non-novel inventions. But it is costly to do so. Because these
costs exceed the nuisance value of these patents when granted, and because
they scale as the patent edges closer to invalidity or invades a more heavily
trafficked (and thus potentially more profitable) field, inventors face severely
diminished incentives to seek questionable patents and employ them in socially
unproductive ways.
4.

Tradeoffs

The administrative cost of patent prosecutions is the mechanism by
which an applicant‘s private information regarding her patent‘s value and her
own intentions is forced into the open. But of course these administrative
procedures need not be the manner in which applicants are made to pay, and
thus induced to self-screen. The PTO could instead require applicants to pay
substantially heightened fees to have a patent examined and granted. Unlike
the procedural costs of shepherding an application through the patent office,
There is, of course, the possibility that a badly drafted patent application on a significant
technology will result in a low-value property right being conferred upon the inventor. For
instance, an inventor might develop a useful technology but draft his patent application in
such a way that it is easily evaded by competitors. While these sorts of weak patents would
undoubtedly hold only modest private value, a costly screen will not deter inventors from
seeking them. At the time of filing, the inventor does not realize that his patent is weak and
thus will believe that it carries greater social value than it actually does.
125

See generally Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 48, at 6–18 (discussing the problem of the
―patent thicket‖).
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patent fees are not deadweight losses; the PTO could simply bestow them
upon future inventors in the form of research grants, as in a tax and transfer
system designed to properly align parties‘ incentives.
The idea of increasing patent office fees is by no means a new one.128
But the potential for increased fees has always been viewed as a means of
purchasing greater scrutiny for patents, not as an alternative to such scrutiny.129 It
is a curious feature of the current patent system that the preponderance of cost
is levied upon applicants in the form of fees paid to third-party attorneys,
particularly in light of the fact that it is essentially impossible to know whether
the administrative procedures that necessitate these attorneys‘ fees are
efficacious or cost-benefit justified.130 It may well be that under the current
patent regime, no level of patent examination will be worth its cost; it may be
that it would be optimal for examiners to spend much more time scrutinizing
patents than they currently do. But as legislators and administrators lever up
or down the quantity of patent procedures in the course of one or another
reform, they would be well advised to understand that they are simultaneously
adjusting the costs imposed upon applicants and thus, crucially, the incentives
those applicants face with respect to patents of questionable validity and value.
Patent fees provide a useful mechanism for resetting these incentives at closer
to optimal levels.

See, e.g., Lemley, Lichtman, & Sampat, supra note 53 (proposing an increase in PTO fees as a
means of funding more extensive patent examination); Osenga, supra note 60 (same); Jaffe &
Lerner, supra note 13 (same). Other commentators have suggested heightened ex post renewal
fees as a means of thinning the patent thicket, see, e.g., Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 48, at
18–22, but these increased fees would impact only truly abandoned inventions and have no
measurable effect on patents destined for use in nuisance lawsuits.
128
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See, e.g., Lemley, Lichtman, & Sampat, supra note 53.

The explanation for this conceivably inefficient structure may lie in the political economy of
the patent system. The patent bar is the largest cohesive political actor with a vested stake in
the patent process, and the patent bar can be expected to oppose any change in PTO
procedures that diminishes the role of patent attorneys. The problem is exacerbated by the
specialization within the field: patent prosecutors, who represent applicants before the PTO,
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patent_prosecutor#United_States, do not typically represent
clients in subsequent patent litigation. The patent bar will thus tend to oppose reforms that
moderates the role of attorneys before the PTO even if it is traded off against increased post
hoc litigation in federal court.
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ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AS INFORMATION-FORCING BARRIERS

Process costs serve as especially salient barriers to entry in the patent
context because the administrative procedures themselves are so ineffectual—
patent examination is strongly biased towards granting even highly
questionable patents. But the patent office is by no means the only setting in
which process costs perform this function. The same essential dynamic
operates in several other contexts: due process protections for employees
subject only to ―for-cause‖ termination and summary-process evictions; the
obtaining of pollution permits; and numerous types of immigration visas, as
well as citizenship status and even residence within the United States. These
cases are not as severe; the administrative processes involved may well have
substantial inherent value, or at least higher value than do patent procedures.
But in all cases, the information-forcing costs of navigating the administrative
system complement and augment the screening value of the procedures
themselves.
Consider a simple model of an administrative procedures that imposes
a cost C upon any private actor who wishes to pursue a particular course of
conduct. Now consider the range of private activities that will be affected
(though not necessarily deterred) by this costly screen, activities with social
values s1, s2, s3 . . . . Imagine that in the presence of the screen, the relevant
actors forego n activities and persist in undertaking k activities. A costly screen
imposes two types of social costs. First, it may succeed in deterring socially
beneficial behavior, and second, it forces those private actors who proceed
with the affected activities to pay upfront costs of C. At the same time, it may
also block private actions that would otherwise create significant social costs.
Costly screens will enhance social welfare whenever the aggregate social harm
of the activities they bar is greater than the remaining procedural costs
themselves: namely, when s1 + s2 . . . + sn > C ×k. Costly screens thus rely on
a type of multiplier effect: they are welfare-enhancing when they discourage a
host of low-private-value activities that might nevertheless carry substantial
negative externalities—the filing of nuisance-value patents, for instance.131
Moreover, they are of particular importance when ―active‖ methods of
examination are ineffective or overly costly. The sections that follow describe
a variety of settings in which these conditions may be met.

See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and sources cited therein. I thank Matthew
Stephenson for many productive conversations on this topic.
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Due Process and Summary Process
1.

Employee Termination Hearings

Employees may possess the right not to be fired except ―for good
cause‖ either as a matter of contract or, in the case of some federal, state, and
municipal employees, as a matter of law.132 Before an employer may discharge
and employee subject to these protections, the employer must provide the
employee with a hearing before a neutral arbiter and demonstrate that good
cause for termination exists.133 (In some cases, the employer may also be
barred from depriving the employee of a salary before the hearing has
concluded.134)
Such hearings are not necessarily walkovers for employers. An
employee may obtain representation, muster effective witnesses and evidence,
and present a strong case that her behavior and performance were within the
firm‘s acceptable boundaries. But employers have a set of systematic
advantages stemming from their comparative size and the fact that they are
repeat players within the system.135 Employers understand what level of proof
is necessary for success in this type of case, having brought many such actions.
Employers are familiar with the limited cast of arbiters who will make the
decisions. And employers have the financial capacity to hire better attorneys,
where necessary. As a result, employee due process hearings are likely to be
biased to some extent in the employer‘s favor.
With these advantages, however, come a number of asymmetric costs.
In most cases, the employer must create and fund the hearing board—paying
See, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-7012 (2007) (―Except as is otherwise provided in this Division, no
deputy sheriff in the County Police Department, no full-time deputy sheriff not employed as a
county police officer or county corrections officer and no employee in the County
Department of Corrections shall be removed, demoted or suspended except for cause, upon
written charges filed with the Board by the Sheriff and a hearing before the Board thereon
upon not less than 10 days' notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof.‖).
132

See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Board of Regents of States Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929–31 (1997); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 544–46 (1985).
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Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
859, 863-64 (1996); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974).
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the hearing officers‘ salaries136 and providing all of the other accoutrements
that attend what is, in essence, a full-blown courtroom hearing.137
Furthermore, in some limited cases the employer must pay the employee
wages during the pendency of the hearing (or the suspension that precedes
it).138 Under most contractual or legislative arrangements these wages are
legally recoverable if the employer succeeds in terminating the employee, but
in practice the employee may be judgment-proof.139 Finally, as the difficulty of
a case increases, or as the employer‘s position becomes less certain, the
employer may have to opt for higher-skilled—and thus more expensive—
attorneys.
Consequently, scholars have suggested that these expensive due
process protections may not be worth the cost to the employer or the
employee. The employee will undoubtedly have to bear some of the cost of
her due process rights in the form of reduced wages or other benefits, and the
hearings may not be as valuable as the employee might hope because of the
employer‘s inherent tactical advantages. Better, perhaps, for both parties to
eliminate the procedural rights and split the savings between them.140
This narrow focus on the results of the pre-termination process and its
administrative cost ignores the costly screening function that those costs
perform. Due process costs force an employer to assess whether the harm
that the employee is causing to the enterprise exceeds the transactional
expense of terminating her. Irrespective of what ―good cause‖ actually means
or what a hearing board may decide, the administrative process sets a
misfeasance threshold for the employment contract: an organization will move
to discharge an employee only when the employee‘s actions threaten
substantial harm to the organization, harm that well exceeds the administrative
See, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-7003 (2007) (stating that each Illinois county is responsible for paying
the salary and expenses of the members of the boards established to conduct due process
hearings county employees).
136

The hearings in these cases are not minor affairs. They are conducted on the record,
involve paper filings and live testimony, and frequently result in written decisions.
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See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 931; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.

Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (―[T]ermination of aid pending resolution
of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to
live while he waits.‖).
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See, e.g., Ellis v. Sheahan, 412 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (suggesting such an
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costs of termination. This is private information that only the organization—
not the employee, and certainly not the hearing officer—possesses, and a
costly process of removal forces the employer to disclose the information in
the service of its own self-screening.141
Moreover, much like the need to prove ―good cause‖ itself, this barrier
is self-enforcing and essentially costless. When an employer decides not to
take disciplinary action against an employee, it need not initiate an
administrative proceeding, it need not hire an attorney, and it need not
compensate the members of the administrative board that would hear the
case.142 Like the cost of filing for a patent, it is the latent threat of having to
pay for a hearing that forces the private party to screen ex ante. This is not to
say that these sorts of due process rights are necessarily cost-benefit justified,
or that employers and employees would not do better to bargain them away or
move entirely to a system of at-will employment.143 I take no position on these
larger questions. The point is merely that the procedural costs associated with
a form of administration may function more effectively as a screening
device—and thus constitute a more valuable protection for employees—than
the administrative process itself. If the termination of an employee of long
standing imposes costs on society that the employer is not forced to bear, this
costly screen may be welfare-enhancing as well.
2.

Housing Evictions

A similar dynamic operates in the context of housing evictions. Before
evicting a tenant who has breached a lease, a landlord must summon the
tenant into court and prevail before a neutral magistrate. The landlord may
not simply cease performing her end of the housing contract by locking the
tenant out.144 This process is meant to be ―summary,‖145 and thus less costly
Just as some firms will litigate nuisance suits, despite the fact that litigation costs exceed
settlement costs, in order to send signals of intransigence, it is certainly possible that some
employers will pursue disciplinary actions against employees whose minor acts of misbehavior
don‘t cross this threshold in order to deter further such actions. But these punitive measures
will likely be the exception, rather than the rule, given the other means of promoting
productive behavior available to employers.
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Which is to say that the salaries paid to hearing officers will reflect this diminished
workload.
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Compare Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984) with
Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev.
481 (1967).
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See Jessie Dukeminier et al., Property 382–408 (6th ed. 2006).
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for both landlords and tenants, but it is nevertheless characterized by many of
the asymmetries of employment due process hearings: it is generally more
costly for landlords than for tenants (though landlords are not asked to fund
the courts); and landlords, as repeat players, have systematic advantages when
cases are contested and heard.
Laws that force landlords into court have been criticized in recent
years, both as wealth transfers from law-abiding tenants to delinquent
tenants146 and as stigmatizing devices that permanently taint tenants who
acquire court records that future landlords can discover.147 These criticisms
are surely valid to some degree, and prohibitions on landlord self-help may do
more harm than good to tenants or to the public as a whole.148 But the value
of the administrative process to tenants likely lies as much in the costs it
imposes upon landlords as in the results that tenants are able to obtain in
court. Landlords must decide ex ante whether removing a troublesome tenant
is genuinely worth the expense. Tenants who do not reach this threshold—
and are thus selected out by the landlord‘s costly screen—will neither have a
black mark placed upon their records nor create additional costs to be borne
by landlords or other tenants. Again, if evictions involve significant negative
externalities, such a screen may do significantly more good than harm.
B.

Environmental Permits

Before a firm may construct a new source of pollution, such as a
factory, it must navigate a dizzying array of federal and state environmental
laws, install pollution-controlling technologies, and obtain a wide variety of
permits from state and, in some cases federal, regulators. In order to comply
with the mandates of the Clean Air Act,149 for instance, firms may be required
to install cutting-edge technology and certify compliance with the necessary
See, e.g., A and M Towing and Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 282 Conn. 434 (2007); Lowell
Housing Authority v. Melendez, 449 Mass. 34 (2007); Hughes v. Sanders, 847 So. 2d 165 (La.
App. Ct. 2003).
145

See Chicago Board of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Posner, J.).
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See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Feedback, at 17–19
(manuscript on file with author).
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technology standards150 and conduct continuous air quality monitoring for a
period of one year151 in order to ―determine the effect which emissions from
any such facility may have . . . on air quality.‖152 The Clean Water Act153
imposes an entirely separate set of mandates, and other federal and state
regulatory bodies may place further demands on prospective polluters.
The pollution-controlling devices that firms must install can be
extremely expensive, but they are far from the only source of cost involved. In
addition, the administrative procedures themselves—the process of obtaining
permits, filing monitoring reports, and ensuring compliance with overlapping
regulatory regimes—can be extremely costly for polluting firms. For instance,
the construction of a new chemical plant, involving the emission of scores of
different chemicals from a variety of different points, can give rise to
―stunningly complex‖ regulatory requirements and engender legal fees that run
to the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, even if the plant‘s
construction is never challenged in court.154 The primary purpose of these
administrative procedures is, of course, to ensure that concentrations of air
and water pollutants remain at acceptable levels. But the high cost of
compliance with environmental laws can serve a secondary purpose by
weeding out those polluting activities that may not be cost-benefit justified, or
at least may stray close to the borderline.155

This may be either technology that achieves the ―lowest achievable emission rate‖ (LAER),
42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2) (2007), or the ―best available control technology‖ (BACT). 42 U.S.C. §
7479(3) (2007), depending on the circumstance. Certification of compliance can be no small
matter. The relevant technology standards can be rather amorphous, and compliance often
relies on the subjective judgment of state regulators. See, e.g., id. (―The term ‗best available
technology means an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each
pollutant . . . which the [state] permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for
such facility . . . .‖); see also Celia Campbell-Mohn et al., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM
RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 820–22 (1997).
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42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(2) (2007).
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Id. § 7475(a)(7) (2007); see also Celia Campbell-Mohn et al., supra note 150, at 820.
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33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2007).
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Celia Campbell-Mohn et al., supra note 150, at 818.

I do not mean to suggest here that environmental permitting processes are ineffectual in
the sense of being easily evaded, but rather that they will not always be well-suited to
measuring the relevant quantity, which for present purposes I take to be overall social welfare.
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Consider the potential construction of a factory. Suppose that the
factory will cost c to construct (exclusive of any costs related to controlling
pollution) and produce benefits b. C and b are private information known only
to the firm; the regulating agency cannot easily discover how much profit
some new project is expected to produce. In the presence of environmental
regulations, the firm must undertake compliance actions (installing scrubbers,
obtaining permits, etc.) at a cost of a and produces pollution that imposes a
social cost of d. If b > c + a, the firm will choose to construct the factory; if b
< c + a, it will not. But the factory is only justified in terms of overall welfare
if b > c + a + d; society must bear the remaining pollution-related externalities,
but the firm need not. Imagine a situation in which that b and c are very
similar—in other words, the factory has positive, but small value net the costs
of construction. If d > b – c (or, to rearrange, if b < d + c), these factories will
do more overall harm than good and should not be built. If a is small, they
may be constructed regardless; if a is larger, the administrative costs of
compliance will discourage firms from undertaking the projects. In a very
rough sense, the administrative expense forces firms to internalize the costs of
their own pollution.
Now consider two firms within the same geographic vicinity, each of
which is contemplating erecting a factory. The two factories have the same
cost and produce the same pollution, but factory 1 provides greater benefits: b1
> b2 > c. Imagine that each factory by itself would be welfare enhancing: b1,2 >
c + a + d. If the costs of pollution are linear—in other words, if each factory
produces pollution with cost d, and together they produce pollution with cost
2d—then both projects are worth pursuing. However, the costs of factory
pollution may not scale linearly. Scientists suspect that many environmental
responses to pollution behave non-linearly within certain domains or
accelerate when pollution levels cross a certain threshold.156 It is conceivable
that the combined pollution cost from both factories would be not 2d, but 2d
+ s, where s is some undesirable synergy created by the two pollution sources.
Together, the factories may not be welfare be enhancing, if b1 + b2 < 2c + 2a +
2d + s. In this case, welfare would be maximized if firm 1 constructed factory
1 (at a benefit of b1) and firm 2 decided to forego factory 2. If a is sufficiently
For instance, the climatological response to greenhouse gas emissions is probably highly
complex and non-linear in some domains. R.B. Alley et al., Abrupt Climate Change, 299
SCIENCE 2005 (2003); John Reilly et al., Uncertainty and Climate Change Assessments, 293 SCIENCE
430, 430 (2002). Dose-response relationships may also be non-linear in a variety of disparate
contexts ranging from nuclear waste contamination, see W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for
Regulatory Agencies, 74 U. CHI. L.R. 209, 235 (2005), to drug treatments. See Jeff Strnad,
Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 SO. CAL. L.R. 1221,
1229 (2005).
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high such that b2 ≈ c + a,157 this is exactly what will occur. The high costs of
procedural compliance will act as a passive screen against the lowest-value
polluters.
The problem with high process costs as a passive barrier is that they
are themselves likely to expend much of the surplus they create. Better, as in
the patent context, to minimize administrative costs and replace them with
high administrative fees, which are not deadweight losses and could be plugged
directly back into national or states fiscs.158 Section 110 of the Clean Air Act
already authorizes states to impose fees in association with permit
applications,159 though few states have availed themselves of the opportunity
and none imposes fees of the necessary magnitude. Alternatively, emissions
trading regimes could be used to select for the highest-value polluters while
simultaneously holding total pollution beneath any relevant threshold.160 Such
trading schemes remain rare, with the Clean Air Act‘s sulfur dioxide deposition
program standing as the only prominent national example.161 Under the right
conditions, fees or emissions-trading programs might be profitably deployed.
In their absence, process costs perform an important screening function.
C.

Immigration and Naturalization

In a recent article, Adam Cox and Eric Posner suggest that the United
States‘ peculiar combination of methods of border control and naturalization
function in large degree as inducements to self-screening.162 For example, the
physical barriers to entry into the country, much like the administrative
processes of having a patent examined and granted, are costly to overcome but
Of course, b2 > c + a by assumption. However, uncertainty and risk aversion might
dissuade firms from investing in a project that is not obviously cost-benefit justified.
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See Part II.C.4., supra.
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nearly always surmountable (sometimes literally so). These ―process‖ costs
thus exist in part to force potential immigrants to reveal private information
about their expected productivity within the United States.163 Only immigrants
who believe that they will be able to earn a great deal of money—and thus the
immigrants that, by one metric, are most desirable—who will elect to attempt
entry.
Related types of self-screening exist throughout the immigration
system. For instance, consider an employer who wishes to hire a highly skilled
foreign worker using an H-1B visa.164 H-1B visas are accompanied by a host
of procedural requirements. These include, first and foremost, the filing of an
extended series of documents with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (―CIS‖) and the payment fees totaling $2,190.165 In addition, the
employer must certify to the Department of Labor that the H-1B visa holder is
earning a salary commensurate with American workers performing the same
jobs, and must ―[p]rovide working conditions for [H-1b holders] that will not
adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed.‖166
Certain U.S. employers may, in addition, be classified as ―H-1B
dependent‖ if a particularly large fraction of their employees are H-1B visa
holders.167 Every H-1B dependent employer must certify: 1) that its H-1Bholding workers will not ―displace‖ any American workers;168 and 2) that it has
163

Id. at 824–27.

The H-1b is a special class of visa available to non-citizens who work in ―specialty
occupation[s],‖ defined as an occupation that involves the application of a ―body highly
specialized knowledge‖ and requires at least a bachelor‘s degree. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2007).
The majority of H-1b recipients are scientists, engineers, doctors, and other technically trained
professionals. See Alexander V. Ifill, Spain’s Double Shock: Hindsight from the United States
Regarding an Immigration Influx and its Effects on Social Security Funding, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
487, 504 n. 87 (2007).
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United States Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Form ETA
9035, available at http://www.dol.gov/libraryforms/forms/ETA/Form_ETA_9035.pdf, at 2;
see also 20 CFR §§ 655.731 & 655.732 (2007).
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attempted to recruit American workers to fill the open positions before hiring
workers via the H-1B process.169 In practice, this means that the employer
must advertise the open position in a newspaper or trade publication before
hiring a foreign worker using an H-1B.170 This process is costly, and can
involve a significant amount of delay. Immigration-centered law firms
typically charge in the neighborhood of $2,000 to complete an H-1B visa
application, exclusive of the fees paid to the CIS and the cost of running a
newspaper advertisement and determining the appropriate market wage.171 In
total, then, an employer will typically spend in the neighborhood of $5,000 to
hire a foreign worker using an H-1B visa.
The procedural requirements involved in the H-1B process—
certification that no American workers are available, that the employer is
paying the prevailing wage, and so forth—are ostensibly designed to ensure
that the employment of H-1B workers will not redound to the detriment of
American workers. They are a type of active examination—they force
employers to collect and disclose the particular information that interests the
government (and the public at large)—and they rely upon the Department of
Labor to scrutinize the private employer‘s claims. At the same time, the screen
is not a particularly effective one. Employers view the duty to advertise an
open position as little more than a pro forma requirement, and tales of fraud
and misconduct abound.172
Simultaneously, though, the private cost of hiring an H-1B worker
functions as a passive screening device that forces the employer to ascertain
and evaluate the same information that the government has targeted actively.
The hiring of a foreign worker, rather than an American citizen, presumably
Id. § 655.739 (2007); see also Form ETA 9035, available at
http://www.dol.gov/libraryforms/forms/ETA/Form_ETA_9035.pdf, at 2.
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imposes some social cost upon the United States as a whole. At the same
time, in many cases it confers a benefit upon the employing firm (and, by
extension, upon the country at large) through the supply of skilled labor for
which there may be no American substitute. By forcing the employer to
navigate a series of expensive administrative procedures before hiring an H-1B
worker, the government effectively ensures that the private benefit to hiring a
foreign worker is substantially higher than the private benefit to hiring an
American, which in turn renders it more likely that hiring the H-1B worker is
cost-benefit justified overall. As with environmental permits, many of the
benefits will be consumed by the same transaction costs that catalyze the
necessary passive screening, and a substitution of higher fees for process
would likely be welfare-enhancing. Nonetheless, the CIS and DOL
procedures may accomplish through passive costs what they failed to achieve
via active screens.
CONCLUSION
Patents do not come cheaply to applicants. Between the cost of hiring
an attorney and the fees that an applicant must pay to the PTO, the average
applicant spends approximately $18,000 to obtain a patent, and possibly much
more if the patent is of debatable validity, concerns a complicated technology,
or resides in a crowded technological field. Scholars have traditionally treated
these expenses as nothing more than the purchase price of the patent
examination process, a series of costs to be avoided or minimized wherever
possible. This approach has overlooked the fact that procedural costs function
as a passive screen against low-value, frivolous patents, the type of patents that
can be used for little other than extracting nuisance settlements. By forcing
prospective applicants to employ private information ex ante in determining
whether to file for patents, the process costs themselves serve as an effective
barrier to a particularly insidious class of property rights.
Administrative costs operate similarly in other contexts. Landlords
who wish to evict tenants through summary process and employers who wish
to terminate employees with due process rights are forced to reveal the private
values they place on the evictions and terminations through their willingness to
pay process costs. NEPA permit applicants demonstrate the economic value
of the pollution-creating activities they wish to engage in via the same
mechanism. Immigrants disclose the private value of their presence in the
United States when they elect to pay the process costs necessary to enter the
country. And employers establish that an H-1B worker is essential to the
business not by advertising and failing to find an American citizen to fill the
same job, but by absorbing the administrative costs required to hire that H-1B
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worker in lieu of a citizen. Even where active administrative processes do not
function effectively or efficiently, the process costs themselves may correct for
many of the administrative scheme‘s inadequacies.
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